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September 21, 2011

Legal Interest on UM Claims

Legal interest on a UM claim begins to run from the date of the original judicial demand against any solidary obligor, regardless of the language in the insurance policy. Ainsworth v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 433 So.2d 709 (La.1983); and Burton v. Foret, 498 So.2d 706, 712 (La.1986).

July 14, 2011

Suit Against a Statutory Employer Interrupts Prescription Against a Solidarily Liable Third-Party Tortfeasor

In a case arising from a fire at an oil well site which left a worker severely burned, a deeply divided Louisiana Supreme Court held in a 4-3 decision that a timely filed lawsuit against a worker's statutory employer who is immune from tort liability and who had not paid any benefits (because benefits were paid by the direct employer) can interrupt prescription against an alleged third-party tortfeasor because of the solidary liability that exists between them for medical expenses and lost wages. Glasgow v. PAR Minerals Corporation, 2010-2011 (La. 5/10/11), rehearing denied, (La.7/14/11). The Supreme Court concluded:

The Civil Code provides a two-part formula for interrupting prescription in this situation: 1) a timely lawsuit (and service, if in an incompetent court; see LSA-C.C. art. 3462); and 2) a solidary relationship between a party sued within the prescriptive period and a party not sued within the prescriptive period (see LSA-C.C. art. 1799 or art. 3503). The procedural posture here is comparable to that in Williams v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 611 So.2d 1183 (La. 1993), except that in Williams, the suit in district court was for workers' compensation and the suit was brought against a direct employer rather than a statutory employer. The procedural distinctions here are without a difference, because LSA-C.C. art. 1797 provides that the source of the solidary relationship is immaterial. For this reason, to the extent Keller v. McLeod, 2003-267 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/11/04), 866 So.2d 388; Williams v. Holiday Inn Worldwide, 2002-0762 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/15/02), 816 So.2d 998; and Layman v. City of New Orleans, 1998-0705 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/9/98), 753 So.2d 254, are inconsistent with the conclusion that a timely lawsuit (and service, if in an incompetent court) against a principal or statutory employer interrupts prescription as to a third-party alleged tortfeasor, those cases are overruled. In the instant case, we find both parts of the formula provided by the Civil Code for interrupting prescription have been met; the lower courts erred in sustaining the alleged third party tortfeasor's exception of prescription. Accordingly, we reverse the decisions of both lower courts and remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
April 12, 2010

Louisiana Supreme Court Rules on Interruption and Renunciation of Prescription

In Torres v. Louisiana Shrimp and Packaging Company, 09-2792 (La.4/9/10), the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' ruling granting defendant's exception of prescription, because a timely filed tort suit interrupts the running of prescription on a workers' compensation claim, and because once a party withdraws a plea of prescription, or renounces prescription, he may not re-urge the plea:

"WRIT GRANTED. It is not disputed by the parties that a timely filed tort suit interrupts the running of prescription on a workers' compensation claim. Isaac v. Lathan, 01-2639, pp. 4-6 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/8/02), 836 So.2d 191, 194-95. In this case, the tort suit filed by the relator against the respondent was dismissed by judgment of the trial court after the withdrawal of the respondent's prescription exception. When a party withdraws a plea of prescription in the trial court, he thereby renounces the prescription originally pleaded and, having thus abandoned it, may not thereafter re-urge it. Foster v. Breaux, 263 La. 1112, 270 So.2d 526, 529 (1972). Accordingly, the timely tort suit interrupted the running of the prescriptive period for filing relator's workers' compensation claim. Moreover, having abandoned the prescription objection to the timeliness of the tort suit, respondent may not now reurge it. Therefore, the ruling by the trial court granting respondent's exception of prescription, and the court of appeal decision affirming the ruling, are reversed. The case is remanded to the office of workers' compensation for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein."

This Louisiana legal update is brought to you by the Baton Rouge, Louisiana injury lawyers at Due', Price, Guidry, Piedrahita & Andrews.

April 6, 2010

Louisiana Supreme Court Applies Discovery Rule to Interrupt Medical Malpractice Prescription

The Louisiana Supreme Court issued the following Per Curiam opinion in Williamson v. Hebert, 10-0071 (La. 4/5/10), regarding the interruption of prescription in a medical malpractice case based on the discovery rule:

"In Campo v. Correa, 01-2707 (La. 6/21/02), 828 So. 2d 502, 511, we explained 'a plaintiff's mere apprehension that something may be wrong is insufficient to commence the running of prescription, unless the plaintiff knew or should have known through the exercise of reasonable diligence that his problem may have been caused by acts of malpractice.' Plaintiff in the instant case clearly had some apprehension something was wrong following her surgery, as she consulted two different doctors regarding her condition. However, both of these doctors assured plaintiff her condition would continue to improve, with one of the doctors indicating her symptoms might take two years to resolve. When plaintiff's symptoms failed to improve by August 2002 (two years after the August 3, 2000 surgery), plaintiff performed computer research, and learned for the first time her symptoms may have been caused by malpractice. Plaintiff's August 16, 2002 complaint was filed within one year of her discovery of this alleged malpractice."

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted plaintiff's writ and reversed the decision of the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal. The judgment of the district court denying the defendant's exception of prescription was reinstated and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings. This is a huge victory for victims of medical malpractice who prudently wait to see if their condition will improve before rushing to file a medical malpractice claim that might otherwise be frivolous.

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