Louisiana Injury Lawyer Blog

Establishing negligence under Louisiana law is accomplished via the following five prong duty / risk analysis:

I. Was the conduct in question a substantial factor in bringing about the harm to the plaintiff, i.e., was it a cause in fact of the harm?

-It is irrelevant in determining cause in fact whether the defendant's actions were lawful, unlawful, intentional, unintentional, negligent, or non-negligent. The inquiry is a neutral one, free of the entanglements of policy considerations - morality, culpability or responsibility-involved in the duty-risk analysis. Ask whether the defendant's conduct was a necessary antecedent of the accident, that is, but for the defendant's conduct, the incident probably would not have occurred.

-Is there a factual causal relationship between the defendant's actions and the plaintiff's injuries? Did defendant's actions have something to do with the injury the plaintiff sustained? Did the defendant's conduct appreciably enhance the chance of the accident occurring?

-Generally, cause in fact entails a "but for" inquiry: If the plaintiff probably would have not sustained the injuries but for the defendant's conduct, such conduct is a cause in fact. But, when multiple causes are present, cause in fact is found to exist when the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's harm.

II. Did the defendant owe a duty to the plaintiff?

-Duty is a question of law. Simply put, the inquiry is whether the plaintiff has any law - statutory or jurisprudential - to support his or her claim?

III. Was the duty breached?

-Did the defendant fail to conform to the legally imposed duty?

IV. Was the risk, and harm caused, within the scope of protection afforded by the duty breached?

-Regardless if stated in terms of proximate cause, legal cause, or duty, the scope of the duty inquiry is ultimately a question of policy as to whether the particular risk falls within the scope of the duty. The scope of protection inquiry asks whether the enunciated rule or principle of law extends to or is intended to protect this plaintiff from this type of harm arising in this manner. Although, the determination of legal cause involves a purely legal question, this legal determination depends on factual determinations of foreseeability and ease of association. The extent of protection owed by a defendant to a plaintiff is made on a case-by-case basis to avoid making a defendant an insurer of all persons against all harms.

-Substandard conduct does not render the actor liable for all consequences spiraling outward until the end of time. Ask whether too much else intervened - time, space, people, and bizarreness?

-Ease of association: in determining whether there is a duty-risk relationship, the inquiry is how easily the risk of injury to plaintiff can be associated with the duty sought to be enforced, or how easily does one associate the plaintiff's complained of harm with the defendant's conduct, or how easily the risk of harm can be associated with the rule which was breached. Is the purpose of the duty substantially related to the risk of harm?

-Although ease of ease of association encompasses the idea of foreseeability, it is not based on foreseeability alone. Ease of association melds policy and foreseeability into one inquiry: Is the harm which befell the plaintiff easily associated with the type of conduct engaged in by the defendant?

-Legal cause requires a proximate relation between the actions of a defendant and the harm which occurs and such relation must be substantial in character.

-Because legal cause analysis is so fact bound, other legal cause cases serve only as examples of the methodology and can only be analogized from when the facts bear a striking resemblance to the case to be decided.

V. Damages.

-Was the defendant's culpable conduct a cause of the plaintiff's harm?

Continue reading "Louisiana's Negligence Duty / Risk Analysis in a Nutshell" »

Given the inherently dangerous nature of gas, gas companies are required to exercise the utmost care to reduce hazards to life as far as is practicable. A gas company is under a duty to safeguard against occurrences that can be reasonably expected or contemplated. When an accident or occurrence can be reasonably anticipated, it is within the scope of the duty owed by the electric company to the injured party because there is an ease of association between the risk presented by the gas company's conduct under the overall circumstances and the resulting injury. An electric company is held to the standard of a reasonable person with superior attributes, and is required to recognize that there will be a certain amount of negligence that must be anticipated.

Foley v. Entergy Louisiana, Inc., 2006-0983 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 144, 154.

Continue reading "Louisiana Jury Instructions - Burn Injuries - Utility has Duty of Utmost Care to Reduce Hazards" »

It is well settled that gas is an inherently dangerous instrumentality because of its highly flammable and explosive character. Those who handle and distribute it are charged with the duty to exercise that degree of care commensurate with its dangerous character and necessary to protect the public from any foreseeable injury therefrom.

Giordano v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 93-1614 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/05/94), 643 So.2d 492, 496.

Continue reading "Louisiana Jury Instructions - Burn Injuries - Highly Flammable and Explosive Character" »

The dangerous nature and hazardous character of gas has been recognized and provision has been made for the regulation of its use in the interest of public safety. Moreover, our law recognizes the greater and higher than ordinary degree of care demanded of those involved in the manufacture, preparation and distribution of gas and similar products.

Home Gas & Fuel Co. v. Miss. Tank Co., 246 La. 625, 633-34, 166 So.2d 252, 255 (1964).

Continue reading "Louisiana Jury Instructions - Burn Injuries - Dangerous Nature of Natural Gas" »

The first, and most obvious, step before submitting requests for special jury instructions is to obtain the trial judge's standard form jury instructions, if he has any. The bulk of the necessary instructions are typically included in those forms, so there is no need to submit requested instructions on those topics. On the other hand, the wording of the form charges may be less than optimal, so they should be carefully compared to counsel's own charges on each topic.

That comparison is possible because today's computer technology makes it easy to compile databases of form jury instructions on specific topics. Ideally, such a database will allow the lawyer to simply go through an index to determine the instructions to submit in a given case.

Instructions typically originate in the statutes or jurisprudence. A case that is on all fours with the present case is a great source of definitive law on the subject at hand, be it liability or damages issues. Some publications, notably Eason's, specifically identify language that is either approved or appropriate for jury instructions. A significant secondary source of civil jury instructions in Louisiana is A. Johnson, Civil Jury Instruction (2d ed. 2001), in 18 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise. West also publishes Pattern Jury Instructions for Civil Cases, compiled by the U.S. Fifth Circuit District Judges Association. Whatever the source of the instruction, it should be identified on the request to facilitate the work of the court in checking the accuracy of the instruction.

One of the advantages of using synthesized jury instructions, whether from a book or not, rather than direct statutory or jurisprudential quotations is that the former are typically much easier for the layperson juror to understand. Given the average educational achievement in society, an instruction full of fifty-cent legalisms may sound impressive to the court reporter, but it will not communicate any meaningful concepts to many members of the jury. Trial lawyers should make a conscious effort to translate their instructions into language that is both understandable and an accurate statement of the law. Clarity is especially important because of jurors' access to the written instructions.

Finally, do not fail to check the other side's requested instructions. Even without any intent to mislead the court, cases get overruled or vital language gets omitted from the instruction. Maintaining objections is much easier when one can cite the proverbial chapter and verse.

Assuming that any error has been adequately preserved on appeal, what is the effect of an erroneous jury instruction? There are two possible situations here. The first is when the jury is simply given the wrong law, as in Berg v. Zummo, 786 So.2d 708 (La. 2001). In these kinds of cases, there are no real factual issues; the issue is simply what law applies to the given facts. The appellate court, in a rather straightforward manner, applies the correct law to the facts to determine the outcome.

The more complicated situation is one in which the jury's factual findings were arguably influenced by the erroneous or omitted instruction. In Nicholas v. Allstate Ins. Co., 99-2522 (La. 8/31/00), 765 So.2d 1017, 1023, the supreme court set forth the law applicable to appellate review in such cases:

Louisiana jurisprudence is well established that an appellate court must exercise great restraint before it reverses a jury verdict because of erroneous jury instructions. Melancon v. Sunshine Const., Inc., 97-1167 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/15/98), 712 So.2d 1011. The basis for this rule of law is that trial courts are given broad discretion in formulating jury instructions and it is well accepted that a trial court judgment will not be reversed so long as the charge correctly states the substance of the law. United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 805 (5 Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833, 101 S.Ct. 104, 66 L.Ed.2d 39 (1980). However, when a jury is erroneously instructed and the error probably contributed to the verdict, an appellate court must set aside the verdict. Smith v. Travelers Ins. Co., 430 So.2d 55 (La.1983). In the assessment of an alleged erroneous jury instruction, it is the duty of the reviewing court to assess such impropriety in light of the entire jury charge to determine if they adequately provide the correct principles of law as applied to the issued framed in the pleadings and evidence and whether they adequately guided the jury in its deliberation. Kaplan v. Missouri-Pacific R.R. Co., 409 So.2d 298, 304-05 (La.App. 3 Cir.1981). Ultimately, the determinative question is whether the jury instructions misled the jury to the extent that it was prevented from dispensing justice. Brown v. White, 405 So.2d 555, 560 (La.App. 4 Cir.1981), aff'd, 430 So.2d 16 (La.1982).

See also Medine v. Roniger, 03-3436 (La. 7/2/04) (same). If this test is satisfied, that is, if the court is convinced that the jury was misled to the point that it was prevented from dispensing justice, then the jury's verdict is not entitled to any deference on appeal, and the manifest error standard of review is abandoned. The appellate court then engages in de novo review of the entire record. In effect, because of Louisiana courts' disinclination to remand for new trials under Gonzales v. Xerox Corp., 320 So.2d 163 (La. 1975), the ultimate effect of improper instructions is typically loss of the right to trial by jury.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1793(C) states, "A party may not assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto either before the jury retires to consider its verdict, or immediately after the jury retires, stating specifically the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection." As one court of appeal has stated, "The proper and efficient administration of civil jury trials demands that a trial judge be given an adequate opportunity to recognize and correct errors he may have committed in his instructions before submitting the case to the jury." Watts v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 309 So.2d 402, 405 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writs denied, 313 So.2d 601 (La. 1975). The supreme court recently held that an appellate court erred in considering the propriety of jury instructions in the absence of any objection by the parties. Guidry v. Dwight Manuel, Inc., 04-C-2031 (La. 11/17/04) 887 So.2d 456 (per curiam).

The contemporaneous objection rule has two requirements. The first, and most familiar, is the temporal requirement -- the objection must be made either before or immediately after the jury retires. Thus in Sledge v. Continental Cas. Co., 25,770 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/24/94), 639 So.2d 805, the court held that an objection made twenty minutes after the jury retired, and after the jury had returned with a question, was too late to preserve any error for appeal.

The second requirement is that of specificity as to both the objectionable matter and the basis for the objection. An objection that is general as to the instructions, or that fails to state the grounds for the objection, does not preserve error for review. Thus, where the record shows an objection, but the grounds are not stated, the objection is deemed waived. See, e.g., Etcher v. Neumann, 00-2282 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/01), 806 So.2d 826, writ denied, 02-0904 (La. 5/31/02), 817 So.2d 105; Sanders v. Bain, 31,362 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/9/98), 722 So.2d 386; Dehart v. Burlington N. & S.F. R. Co., 03-279 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/28/03), 860 So.2d 248, writ denied, 03-3251 (La. 26/04), 865 So.2d 732. It is the objecting party's responsibility to ensure that both the objection and its asserted basis appear in the record. Menzie Tile Co. v. Professional Centre, 594 So.2d 410 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991), writ denied, 600 So.2d 610 (La. 1992).

Despite the requirements of article 1793(C), some Louisiana courts have recognized an exception to the contemporaneous objection requirement in cases of "plain and fundamental error."

In Berg v. Zummo, 786 So.2d 708, 716 n.5 (La. 2001), the lower courts, on the basis of a jury verdict, awarded exemplary damages under La. C.C. article 2315.4 against a server of alcoholic beverages. The plaintiff argued that the defendants had not objected to the pertinent jury instructions, but the supreme court rejected that argument, stating that "the jury instructions and interrogatories . . . misstated the law and thus contained a 'plain and fundamental' error which leads us to relax the contemporaneous objection requirement." But the court did not use this to justify a de novo fact review, but only to justify reviewing the legal correctness of the unobjected-to instructions and interrogatories. At least two intermediate appellate court cases have reviewed jury instructions in the absence of an objection in cases of "plain" or "clear" error. Jones v. Peyton Place, Inc., 95-0574 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/22/96), 675 So.2d 754, 760-61 (failure to instruct the jury on the plaintiff's alternative theory of strict liability under former La. C.C. art. 2317 held to have interdicted fact finding and thus justified de novo review); Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 94-1758 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/15/95), 661 So.2d 1052, 1057 & n.10, writs denied, 95-2477, 95-2490, 95- 2498 (La. 1/5/96), 666 So.2d 295, 296 (erroneous creation of an independent cause of action for aiding and abetting fraud tainted the verdict and thus required de novo review). Several other cases have referred to the doctrine in dicta, while not finding plain or fundamental error present.

Despite these cases, there remain indications that the doctrine may not be wholly embraced by the Louisiana Supreme Court. In State v. Thomas, 427 So.2d 428 (La. 1983), the court rejected a "plain error" exception in Louisiana criminal cases, because (as here) the Louisiana code article was silent, while the analogous federal rule, Fed. R. Cr. P. 52(b), explicitly recognized such an exception. And in Nicholas v. Allstate Ins. Co., 99-2522 (La. 8/31/00), 765 So.2d 1017, 1023 n.7, the court reviewed instructions that had not been assigned as error on appeal, but explicitly stated that it "in no way abrogate[d] that body of jurisprudence which requires that a party must assert an objection in the trial court in order for an appellate court to reach the issue." In light of these cases, and the further uncertainty concerning whether a given error will be deemed sufficiently "fundamental," the cautious practitioner will continue to make the objection in accordance with article 1793(C).

Trial counsel should always review the final jury instructions prior to closing. Paragraph B of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1793 provides: "The court shall inform the parties of its proposed action on the written requests and shall also inform the parties of the instructions it intends to give to the jury at the close of the evidence within a reasonable time prior to their arguments to the jury." Familiarity with the instructions allows the lawyer to tailor the argument to fit the instructions, by explaining the significance of favorable instructions and explaining why unfavorable instructions should not apply to the particular case.

Although this paper is primarily concerned with instructions given at the close of evidence pursuant to article 1792(B), paragraph A of that article allows the judge to instruct the jury "[a]t any time during the trial." This is commonly done, for example, when an expert witness is called to testify; the judge often instructs the jury at that point concerning the ability of experts to testify about their opinions. Some commentators urge caution, however, because mid-trial instructions may unduly influence the jury. See, e.g., F. Maraist & H. Lemmon, Civil Procedure § 11.10, at 304, in 1 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1999).

Article 1796 also allows the court to provide additional or corrected instructions to the jury after the jury has retired for deliberation. This can only be done after notice is given to the parties; further instruction without notice taints the verdict. Carpenter v. Hannan, 01-0467 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/28/02), 818 So.2d 226; Lawson v. Strauss, 98-2096 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/8/99), 750 So.2d 234, writ denied, 00-0120 (La. 3/17/00), 756 So.2d 1144.

The primary responsibility for instructing the jury lies with the judge. La. C.C.P. art. 1792(B). Adequate jury instructions are those that fairly and reasonably point out the issues presented by the evidence and the pleadings and provide correct principles of law for the jury to apply. Luman v. Highlands Ins. Co., 25,445 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/23/94), 632 So.2d 910. Since 1997, paragraph C of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1792 has allowed the jury to review a written copy of the instructions.

The court is not required to give the precise instructions requested by either party. Rather, the judge must give instructions that properly reflect the applicable law in light of the facts of the particular case. Goodman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 98-732 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/19/99), 736 So.2d 310, writs denied, 99-1788, 99-1793 (La. 10/1/99), 748 So.2d 450. "Proper jury instructions are those which fairly and reasonably point up the issues presented by the pleadings and evidence and provide correct principles of law for the jury to apply to those issues." Crooks v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 620 So.2d 421 (La. App. 3rd Cir.), writs denied, 629 So.2d 391, 392 (La. 1993). Obviously, a requested instruction that misstates the law is objectionable. But even if it correctly states the law, a requested instruction can be refused if it repeats matters included elsewhere in the instructions, Wilson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 401 So.2d 500 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981), or if there is not sufficient evidence to support it, Knight v. First Guaranty Bank, 577 So.2d 263 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writs denied, 581 So.2d 688, 690 (La. 1990).

The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal has repeatedly stated that "[t]he trial court is responsible for reducing the possibility of confusing the jury." Baxter v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, 98-1054 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/14/99), 734 So.2d 901; see also McCrea v. Petroleum, Inc., 96-1962 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/29/97), 705 So.2d 787; Johnson v. Terrebonne Parish Sheriff's Office, 95-1180 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/23/96), 669 So.2d 577, writ denied, 96-727 (La. 4/26/96), 672 So.2d 907. This responsibility should persuade the trial court that, whenever possible, accurate instructions in plain English should be preferred over legalese.

Retired Louisiana District and Court of Appeal Judge, Bob Downing, provided this simple and easy to understand general jury instruction that he often used when he was a Louisiana district court judge. The new Louisiana Supreme Court Committee tasked with trying to simply the current jury instructions in use today would be well served to review retired-Judge Downing's closing instruction:

You should deliberate on this case without regard to sympathy, prejudice, or passion for or against any party to this suit. This case should be considered as an action between persons of equal standing in the community. A corporation or an insurance company is entitled to the same fair trial at your hands as a private individual. All persons stand equal before the law, and are to be dealt with as equals.

If I have said or done anything which has suggested to you that I favor the claim of either party, you should disregard it. If I have indicated in any way that I have any opinion as to the facts in this case, you should disregard that. I am not the judge of the facts. You are the judges of the facts.

It is your duty as jurors to follow the law as I state it to you. Whether or not you agree with the law, you must follow the law.

You should consider what I say about the law as a whole. You should not single out any one sentence, or individual point or idea, and ignore the others. The order in which the statements about the law are made has no significance as to their relative importance.

The evidence which you are to consider consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the documents, if any, that have been admitted into evidence, and any reasonable conclusions which you can draw from the evidence submitted to you. Neither the arguments by the lawyers, nor any comment or ruling which I may have made is evidence.

In judging the truthfulness of the witnesses which you have heard, you should have in mind the rule that a witness is presumed to speak the truth about facts within his knowledge. This presumption, however, may be overcome by contradictory evidence, by the manner in which the witness testified, by the character of his testimony, or by evidence that relates to his motives.

You are not bound to decide any issue of fact in accordance with the number or witnesses presented on that point. The test is not which side brings the greater amount of evidence, but rather which witnesses and which evidence appeals to your minds as being the most accurate and the most convincing.

Lay witnesses are expected to testify about facts within their knowledge; the rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit witnesses to testify as to their opinions or conclusions about those facts. An exception to this rule exists as to those whom we call "expert witnesses." These are people who, by education and experience, have become expert in some field, and are permitted to state their opinions as to relevant matters in the fields in which they profess to be expert, and give their reasons for those opinions. You should consider each expert opinion received into evidence in this case, and give it such weight as you may think it deserves.

If you should decide that the opinion of an expert witness is not based upon sufficient education and experience, or if you should conclude that the reasons given in support of the opinion are not sound, or if you feel that it is outweighed by other evidence, you may disregard the opinion entirely.

This is a suit seeking damages for injury caused by the act of another. The applicable law is found in Article 2315 of our Civil Code:

"Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."

Plaintiff must prove more probable than not that:

(1) the defendant was at fault;
(2) the injury the plaintiff suffered was, in fact, caused by the fault of the defendants; and
(3) there was actual damage to the plaintiff's person or his property.

If you decide that the plaintiff has established these elements of his case more probable than not, you must decide the question of whether there has been damage to his person or his property and if so, the amount of that damage.

Our law, contemplates just and reasonable compensation for injuries. It suggests no idea of revenge or punishment. Accordingly, our law doe not permit the awarding of damages to punish the defendant, or make an example of him to prevent other accidents, and you should include no such amount in your award. Your award should be designed to fully and fairly compensate the plaintiff for his injury, if you find one has occurred, and should not go beyond such compensation.

The law realizes the difficulty in translating personal injuries into a dollars and cents figure, but that is what must be done. You must arrive at a figure that will fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiff for the damage he has already suffered, and that he will in all likelihood suffer in the future. In estimating such damages, you may take into consideration the following elements:

(1) physical injury suffered;
(2) pain and suffering, both physical and mental;
(3) permanent disability, if any;
(4) loss of earnings, if any;
(5) medical expenses;
(6) property damage;
(7) loss of consortium.

Like other parts of the plaintiff's case, these damages must be established more probable than not. This means, on the one hand, that you are not entitled to award speculative damages for injuries which you think the plaintiff might have suffered or might suffer in the future; on the other hand, it means that you may make an effort to reasonably approximate the damages which plaintiff has proved are more probable than not, even though they cannot be computed with mathematical certainty.

In reaching a verdict on the question of damages, do not include anything for payment of court costs and attorneys fees; the law does not consider these as damages suffered by the plaintiff. Any amount which you might award to the plaintiff is not income within the meaning of the income tax laws.

If you decide to make and award, do not add or subtract from that award on account of federal or state income taxes.

Finally, let me say that the fact that I have given you these statements about the law of damages does not in any way imply that I feel that any damages are due in this case. Whether or not damages are due is solely for you to determine.

The first thing you should do when you retire to the jury room is elect a foreperson. That person should act as a moderator, not an advocate. The foreperson should make sure that each juror is heard.

It is usually not a good idea for a juror, when he first enters the jury room, to make an emphatic expression of his opinion on the case or announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. When one does that at the outset, his sense of pride may be at issue, and he may hesitate to back down from an announced position, even if he is shown to be wrong. Remember that you are not advocates in this matter, but rather you are judges.

You each must decide the case for yourself, but you should do so only after a consideration of the case with your fellow jurors, and you should not hesitate to change an opinion when you are convinced you are wrong. However, you should not be influenced to vote in anyway on any question which you have to decide by the fact that a majority of your fellow jurors favor such a decision. In other words, you should not surrender your honest convictions for the mere purpose of returning a verdict or solely because of the opinion of the other jurors.

The law requires that nine of you agree in order to render a verdict for either side.

When nine of you are of the same opinion about this case, that ends your deliberation and that opinion should be your verdict. Sign and date the verdict form and notify the Bailiff..

The loss of a less-than-even chance of survival is a distinct injury compensable as general damages which cannot be calculated with mathematical certainty. The jury should make a subjective determination of the value of that loss, fixing the amount of money that would adequately compensate the survivor for that particular loss. In awarding damages for loss of a chance of survival, the jury is to focus on the chance of survival lost on account of the medical negligence as a distinct compensable injury and to value the lost chance as a lump sum award based on all the evidence in the record. In considering an award for loss of a chance of survival, the jury may consider evidence of percentages of chance of survival, loss of support, loss of love and affection, and other wrongful death damages. Smith v. State, 95-0038, (La. 6/25/96), 676 So.2d 543, 547-49.

Even if the negligence of a doctor did not cause the patient's death, because he was likely to have died anyway, damages can still be awarded if the doctor's negligence caused the patient to lose a less-than-even chance of survival. A loss of a chance of survival in any degree is compensable in damages. To establish causation in a situation when the patient dies, the survivor need only prove that the defendant's medical negligence resulted in the patient's loss of a chance of survival. The survivor does not have to prove that the patient would have survived if properly treated. Martin v. East Jefferson General Hosp., 582 So.2d 1272, 1278 (La. 1991); Hastings v. Baton Rouge General Hosp., 498 So.2d 713, 720 (La. 1986); and Smith v. State, 95-0038 (La. 6/25/96); 676 So.2d 543, 547.

There is no presumption that a doctor possesses the required skill and knowledge required of him by the controlling medical standards and that in treating his patients, that he applies that knowledge and skill. Williams v. Golden, 95-2712 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/23/97), 699 So.2d 102, 106-07, writ denied, 1997-2788 (La. 1/30/98), 709 So.2d 708.

Where medical disciplines overlap, a specialist in one field may give expert testimony as to the standard of care applicable to areas of the practice of medicine common to both disciplines. Corley v. State, DHH, 32,613 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/30/99), 749 So.2d 926, 931-32, citing Leyva v. Iberia General Hospital, 94-0795 (La.10/17/94), 643 So.2d 1236; Richardson v. State, 98-918 (La.App. 3 Cir.12/09/98), 726 So.2d 417; Kippers v. Corcoran, 97-870 (La.App. 5 Cir.01/27/98), 707 So.2d 463; Smith v. Juneau, 95-0724 (La.App. 4 Cir.04/09/97), 692 So.2d 1365; and Ricker v. Hebert, 94-1743 (La.App. 1 Cir.05/05/95), 655 So.2d 493.