Louisiana Injury Lawyer Blog

There is a one year prescriptive period for survival action claims in Louisiana. The right to recover survival action damages for injuries sustained by a deceased person prior to their death may be brought only by the following exclusive class of beneficiary (including by adoption):

(1) The surviving spouse and child or children of the deceased, or either the spouse or the child or children.

(2) The surviving father and mother of the deceased, or either of them if he left no spouse or child surviving. However, a father or mother who has abandoned the deceased during his minority is deemed not to have survived him.

(3) The surviving brothers and sisters of the deceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse, child, or parent surviving.

(4) The surviving grandfathers and grandmothers of the deceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse, child, parent, or sibling surviving.

(5) The deceased's succession representative in the absence of any of the above class of beneficiary.

There is a one year prescriptive period for wrongful death claims in Louisiana. If a person dies due to the fault of another, suit may be brought only by the following exclusive class of beneficiary (including by adoption) to recover wrongful death damages which they sustained as a result of the death:

(1) The surviving spouse and child or children of the deceased, or either the spouse or the child or children.

(2) The surviving father and mother of the deceased, or either of them if he left no spouse or child surviving. However, a father or mother who has abandoned the deceased during his minority is deemed not to have survived him.

(3) The surviving brothers and sisters of the deceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse, child, or parent surviving.

(4) The surviving grandfathers and grandmothers of the deceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse, child, parent, or sibling surviving.

In any action (or claim for recovery of damages for injury, death, or loss asserted under any law or legal doctrine or theory of liability, regardless of the basis of liability) for damages where a person suffers injury, death, or loss, the degree or percentage of fault of all persons causing or contributing to the injury, death, or loss (including victim fault) shall be determined, regardless of whether the person is a party to the action or a nonparty, and regardless of the person's insolvency, ability to pay, immunity by statute, including but not limited to the provisions of R.S. 23:1032 (employer Worker's Compensation immunity), or that the other person's identity is not known or reasonably ascertainable (phantom tortfeasors).

If a person suffers injury, death, or loss as a result partly of his own negligence and partly as a result of the fault of an intentional tortfeasor, his claim for recovery of damages shall not be reduced.

He who conspires with another person to commit an intentional or willful act is answerable, in solido, with that person, for the damage caused by such act. If liability is not solidary then liability for damages caused by two or more persons shall be a joint and divisible obligation. A joint tortfeasor shall not be liable for more than his degree of fault and shall not be solidarily liable with any other person for damages attributable to the fault of such other person, including the victim regardless of such other person's insolvency, ability to pay, degree of fault, immunity by statute or otherwise, including but not limited to immunity as provided in R.S. 23:1032 (employer Worker's Compensation immunity), or that the other person's identity is not known or reasonably ascertainable (phantom tortfeasors).

Interruption of prescription against one joint tortfeasor is effective against all joint tortfeasors.

Generally, no person shall be liable for damages for injury, death, or loss of the operator
of a motor vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, or vessel who is found to be in excess of 25% negligent as a contributing factor in causing his damages as a result of operating a motor vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, or vessel while his blood alcohol concentration was 0.08, or who was operating while he was under the influence of any controlled dangerous substance unless prescribed or provided by a health care provider.

As recognized by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Dumas v. State, DCRT, 2002-0563 (La. 10/15/02), 828 So.2d 530, 537, prior to the 1996 tort reform amendments to La. C.C. arts. 2323 and 2324(B), the policy behind Louisiana's tort law was ensuring that innocent victims received full compensation for their injuries. With the 1996 amendments, the Louisiana Legislature shifted Louisiana's policy so that each tortfeasor pays only for that portion of the damage he has caused and the tortfeasor shall not be solidarily liable with any other person for damages attributable to the fault of that other person. With the advent of this new policy, the right of contribution among solidary tortfeasors also disappeared since it is no longer necessary in light of the abolishment of solidarity. The Louisiana Legislature struck a new balance in favor of known, present and solvent tortfeasors instead of the previous priority that fully compensated injured victims.

The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Watson v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 469 So.2d 967, 974 (La. 1985), adopted the following factors (now known as the Watson factors) for determining the percentages of fault to be assigned to culpable tortfeasors, the trier of fact shall consider both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed. In assessing the nature of the conduct of the parties, various factors may influence the degree of fault assigned, including:

(1) whether the conduct resulted from inadvertence or involved an awareness of the danger;

(2) how great a risk was created by the conduct;

(3) the significance of what was sought by the conduct;

(4) the capacities of the actor, whether superior or inferior; and

(5) any extenuating circumstances which might require the actor to proceed in haste, without proper thought.

And, as evidenced by concepts such as last clear chance, the relationship between the fault/negligent conduct and the harm to the plaintiff are considerations in determining the relative fault of the parties.

Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 99-1222 (La.11/30/99), 752 So.2d 762, 766-68, held that while Louisiana business owners generally have no duty to protect others from the criminal acts of third persons, they do have a duty to implement reasonable measures to protect their patrons from criminal acts when those acts are foreseeable. Determining when a crime is foreseeable is a critical inquiry in the duty equation. This inquiry is answered employing a balancing test. The foreseeability of the crime risk on the defendant's property and the gravity of the risk determine the existence and the extent of the defendant's duty. The greater the foreseeability and gravity of the harm, the greater the duty of care that will be imposed on the business. A very high degree of foreseeability is required to give rise to a duty to post security guards, but a lower degree of foreseeability may support a duty to implement lesser security measures such as using surveillance cameras, installing improved lighting or fencing, or trimming shrubbery. The plaintiff has the burden of establishing the duty the defendant owed under the circumstances. The foreseeability and gravity of the harm are to be determined by the facts and circumstances of the case. The most important factor to be considered is the existence, frequency and similarity of prior incidents of crime on the premises, but the location, nature and condition of the property should also be taken into account. It is highly unlikely that a crime risk will be sufficiently foreseeable for the imposition of a duty to provide security guards if there have not been previous instances of crime on the business' premises.

Establishing negligence under Louisiana law is accomplished via the following five prong duty / risk analysis:

I. Was the conduct in question a substantial factor in bringing about the harm to the plaintiff, i.e., was it a cause in fact of the harm?

-It is irrelevant in determining cause in fact whether the defendant's actions were lawful, unlawful, intentional, unintentional, negligent, or non-negligent. The inquiry is a neutral one, free of the entanglements of policy considerations - morality, culpability or responsibility-involved in the duty-risk analysis. Ask whether the defendant's conduct was a necessary antecedent of the accident, that is, but for the defendant's conduct, the incident probably would not have occurred.

-Is there a factual causal relationship between the defendant's actions and the plaintiff's injuries? Did defendant's actions have something to do with the injury the plaintiff sustained? Did the defendant's conduct appreciably enhance the chance of the accident occurring?

-Generally, cause in fact entails a "but for" inquiry: If the plaintiff probably would have not sustained the injuries but for the defendant's conduct, such conduct is a cause in fact. But, when multiple causes are present, cause in fact is found to exist when the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's harm.

II. Did the defendant owe a duty to the plaintiff?

-Duty is a question of law. Simply put, the inquiry is whether the plaintiff has any law - statutory or jurisprudential - to support his or her claim?

III. Was the duty breached?

-Did the defendant fail to conform to the legally imposed duty?

IV. Was the risk, and harm caused, within the scope of protection afforded by the duty breached?

-Regardless if stated in terms of proximate cause, legal cause, or duty, the scope of the duty inquiry is ultimately a question of policy as to whether the particular risk falls within the scope of the duty. The scope of protection inquiry asks whether the enunciated rule or principle of law extends to or is intended to protect this plaintiff from this type of harm arising in this manner. Although, the determination of legal cause involves a purely legal question, this legal determination depends on factual determinations of foreseeability and ease of association. The extent of protection owed by a defendant to a plaintiff is made on a case-by-case basis to avoid making a defendant an insurer of all persons against all harms.

-Substandard conduct does not render the actor liable for all consequences spiraling outward until the end of time. Ask whether too much else intervened - time, space, people, and bizarreness?

-Ease of association: in determining whether there is a duty-risk relationship, the inquiry is how easily the risk of injury to plaintiff can be associated with the duty sought to be enforced, or how easily does one associate the plaintiff's complained of harm with the defendant's conduct, or how easily the risk of harm can be associated with the rule which was breached. Is the purpose of the duty substantially related to the risk of harm?

-Although ease of ease of association encompasses the idea of foreseeability, it is not based on foreseeability alone. Ease of association melds policy and foreseeability into one inquiry: Is the harm which befell the plaintiff easily associated with the type of conduct engaged in by the defendant?

-Legal cause requires a proximate relation between the actions of a defendant and the harm which occurs and such relation must be substantial in character.

-Because legal cause analysis is so fact bound, other legal cause cases serve only as examples of the methodology and can only be analogized from when the facts bear a striking resemblance to the case to be decided.

V. Damages.

-Was the defendant's culpable conduct a cause of the plaintiff's harm?

Continue reading "Louisiana's Negligence Duty / Risk Analysis in a Nutshell" »

The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld a $23 million St. Landry Parish jury verdict in favor of six members of an Opelousas, Louisiana family who were horribly burned in a house fire and explosion in June 2003. According to the family's lead trial attorney, Randy Piedrahita, of the Baton Rouge, Louisiana personal injury law firm of Due', Price, Guidry, Piedrahita & Andrews, Centerpoint Energy was held responsible for one-half of the judgment for failing to properly lock its gas meter when discontinuing service to a rent house for non-payment. Centerpoint Energy failed to comply with federal law and its internal procedures by either placing a locking device on the gas meter to prevent it from being turned on, or installing a blind plate to prevent the flow of gas through the line in the event the meter was turned on by an unauthorized person. Centerpoint Energy's negligence enabled just such an unauthorized person to turn the gas meter on to the rent house with devastating consequences to the residents because of a gas pipe that had inadvertently been left open in the house. Fugitive gas flowed into the house for several hours while the family slept, and was then ignited by an unknown source.

Continue reading "Multi-Million Dollar Jury Verdict Against Centerpoint Energy Upheld by Louisiana Supreme Court" »

"In the absence of bad faith, a liability insurer generally is free to settle or to litigate at its own discretion, without liability to its insured for a judgment in excess of the policy limits. William Shelby McKenzie & H. Alston Johnson, III, 15 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise-Insurance Law and Practice § 218 (1986). On the other hand, a liability insurer is the representative of the interests of its insured, and the insurer, when handling claims, must carefully consider not only its own self-interest, but also its insured's interest so as to protect the insured from exposure to excess liability. Holtzclaw v. Falco, Inc., 355 So.2d 1279 (La.1978) (on rehearing). Thus, a liability insurer owes its insured the duty to act in good faith and to deal fairly in handling claims. Id." Smith v. Audubon Ins. Co., 679 So.2d 372 (La.1996).

"[T]he determination of whether the insurer acted in bad faith turns on the facts and circumstances of each case. Of course, an insurer is not obliged to compromise litigation just because the claimant offers to settle a claim for serious injuries within the policy limits, and its failure to do so is not by itself proof of bad faith. The determination of good or bad faith in an insurer's deciding to proceed to trial involves the weighing of such factors, among others, as the probability of the insured's liability, the extent of the damages incurred by the claimant, the amount of the policy limits, the adequacy of the insurer's investigation, and the openness of communications between the insurer and the insured. Nevertheless, when an insurer has made a thorough investigation and the evidence developed in the investigation is such that reasonable minds could differ over the liability of the insured, the insurer has the right to choose to litigate the claim, unless other factors, such as a vast difference between the policy limits and the insured's total exposure, dictate a decision to settle the claim." Id.

An insurer's duty to defend its insured is broader than its liability for damage claims. The insurer's duty to defend suits brought against its insured is determined by the allegations of the injured plaintiff's petition, with the insurer being obligated to furnish a defense unless the petition unambiguously excludes coverage. American Home Assurance Co. v. Czarniecki, 230 So.2d 253 (La.1970).

Once a petition states one claim within the policy's coverage, the insurer has a duty to accept defense of the entire lawsuit, even though other claims in the petition fall outside the policy's coverage. Ellis v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 619 So.2d 1130 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 625 So.2d 1043 (La.1993).

If the insurer chooses to represent the insured but deny coverage, it must employ separate counsel. If it fails to do so, the insurer is liable for attorney's fees and costs the insured may incur in defending the suit. Dugas Pest Control of Baton Rouge v. Mutual Fire, Marine and Inland Ins. Co., 504 So.2d 1051 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1987).

When an insurer, with knowledge of facts indicating noncoverage under the insurance policy, assumes or continues the insured's defense without obtaining a nonwaiver agreement to reserve its coverage defense and without providing separate counsel, the insurer waives such policy defense. Steptoe v. Masco Construction Co., 643 So.2d 1213 (La.1994).

For insurance policy language which limits coverage to "accidents which occur during the policy period", the loss occurs at the time the tort is committed, and not when the loss is discovered or becomes manifest. Audubon Coin & Stamp Co. v. Alford Safe & Lock Co., 230 So.2d 278 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1969).

In determining whether the loss was caused by "accident," the loss must be examined from the viewpoint of the person injured and if the injury was unforeseen, unexpected, and extraordinary it must be held to have been caused by "accident." Id.

The standard commercial general liability policy contains "work-product" exclusions. "These exclusions reflect the intent of the insurance industry to avoid the possibility that coverage under a CGL policy will be used to repair and replace the insured's defective products and faulty workmanship." McKenzie & Johnson, 15 La. Civil Law Treatise, Insurance Law and Practice, 3d, p.555.

For insurance policy language which limits coverage to "damage which occurs during the policy period," there is no coverage for damages accidentally occurring after the policy expiration, but resulting from a delictual act committed during the policy period. Oceanonics, Inc. v. Petroleum Distributing Company, 292 So.2d 190 (La.1974).

"Claims Made" policy: coverage is effective only if the negligent harm is discovered and reported within the policy term.

"Occurrence" policy: coverage is effective if the negligent harm occurs within the policy period, regardless of the date of discovery.

Livingston Parish School Board v. Fireman's Fund American Insurance Co., 282 So.2d 478 (La.1973).

"One of the seminal statements on the subject of distinguishing claims-made from occurrence policies was:

With the development of a more complex society, it became more reasonable, particularly with respect to the activities of professionals, to insure against the making of claims, rather than the happening of occurrences, and "claims made" insurance developed to meet a need for professionals to insure against the making of a claim as the insured event, rather than having to struggle with traditional concepts and difficulties inherent in determining whether the "event" insured against was the commission of an act, error or omission or the date of discovery thereof or the date of injury caused thereby.

The major distinction between the "occurrence" policy and the "claims made" policy constitutes the difference between the peril insured. In the "occurrence" policy, the peril insured is the "occurrence" itself. Once the "occurrence" takes place, coverage attaches even though the claim may not be made for some time thereafter. While in the "claims made" policy, it is the making of the claim which is the event and peril being insured and, subject to policy language, regardless of when the occurrence took place. Sol Kroll, The Professional Liability Policy "Claims Made," 13 Forum 842, 843 (1978)."